<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Encryption on Linux Security</title><link>https://linuxtransfer.com/tags/encryption/</link><description>Recent content in Encryption on Linux Security</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en</language><lastBuildDate>Wed, 04 Nov 2026 08:23:38 +0200</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://linuxtransfer.com/tags/encryption/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>The Cost of Over‑Broad Retention: How a 30‑Day Backup Policy Exposed 2 TB of PHI</title><link>https://linuxtransfer.com/post/2026-11-04-the-cost-of-overbroad-retention-how-a-30day-b/</link><pubDate>Wed, 04 Nov 2026 08:23:38 +0200</pubDate><guid>https://linuxtransfer.com/post/2026-11-04-the-cost-of-overbroad-retention-how-a-30day-b/</guid><description>&lt;p>A 30‑day retention window is a default in many backup scripts and commercial tools. It feels safe: “I’ll keep the last month of data, that’s enough for recovery.” In 2025, a mid‑size clinic used exactly that policy on a set of encrypted LVM snapshots stored on a single NAS. When the NAS firmware update rolled out, the snapshots were corrupted, and the backup system fell back to a &lt;em>restore‑all&lt;/em> mode. The result? 2 TB of unencrypted PHI leaked to a rogue process that had gained write access to the backup directory.&lt;/p></description></item></channel></rss>