<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Iam on Linux Security</title><link>https://linuxtransfer.com/tags/iam/</link><description>Recent content in Iam on Linux Security</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en</language><lastBuildDate>Thu, 05 Nov 2026 11:38:46 +0200</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://linuxtransfer.com/tags/iam/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Hardening Serverless Function IAM: A Step‑by‑Step Fix for Over‑Permissive Execution Roles</title><link>https://linuxtransfer.com/post/2026-11-05-hardening-serverless-function-iam-a-stepbyste/</link><pubDate>Thu, 05 Nov 2026 11:38:46 +0200</pubDate><guid>https://linuxtransfer.com/post/2026-11-05-hardening-serverless-function-iam-a-stepbyste/</guid><description>&lt;p>When a serverless function is granted a blanket &lt;code>AdministratorAccess&lt;/code> policy, the blast radius of a compromised function is the entire account. In 2025, a handful of high‑profile breaches were traced back to overly permissive IAM roles attached to Lambda, Cloud Functions, or Azure Functions. The fix is simple: reduce the scope of the role to the minimum set of actions required by the function. Below is a practical walkthrough that blends AWS, Azure, and GCP examples, with a focus on Linux sysadmins who are comfortable with CLI, JSON, and policy evaluation.&lt;/p></description></item></channel></rss>